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Nuclear Reactor - Nuclear Power: Function and Risks - Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR)


Nuclear Reactor: Function and Risks - Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR), Nuclear Power Plant

Nuclear Reactor: How does a pressurized water reactor work?


Many nuclear power plants
operate with pressurized water reactors (PWRs). The PWR is the most common reactor type. Nuclear fission of the fuel elements heats up the water in the reactor to approximately 315°C (600°F). The water is constantly kept under pressure (about 2200 psig [15 Mpa]). To control or shut down a nuclear reactor, control rods are used. When a control rod is inserted into the reactor core, it absorbs a part of the neutrons released by the nuclear fission events. Thus, the neutrons are not available to trigger off further nuclear fissions. In this way, uncontrolled increase of chain-reactions in the reactor is prevented.


The 315°C warm water
heats up the second coolant loop by means of a heat exchanger (here called steam generator). In the secondary coolant loop the steam generator forms steam which drives the turbine.


Every nuclear power plant
(PWRs as well) produces an amount of radioactivity of a hiroshima bomb per megawatt of electric power in one year operating time. This means that in a nuclear power plant with an annual power of 1200 MW the radioactivity of approximately 1200 hiroshima bombs comes into existence.



Certain parts of the radioactive material
decay very quickly. Others, however, have half-lives longer than 24,000 years (e.g. plutonium) and therefore,they will actually exist permanently. Ageing nuclear power plants with extended operating times and embrittled reactor vessels heighten the risk of an accident.


This type of reactor is not technically safe,
as can be seen from the nuclear meltdown in the almost new PWR in 1979 in Harrisburg, U.S. (Three Mile Island accident). In case of an accident or a terrorist attack, the nuclear power plant is shut down by means of the control rods. However, for a period of several days after the shutdown,the radioactive decay of the fission products continues to generate heat.


All nuclear power plants
are provided with redundant emergency cooling systems to safely remove the decay heat also in the event of a disaster. When the cooling systems breaks down (as it occurred during the Three Mile Island accident), the rising temperature can cause a nuclear meltdown.
If the fuel assemblies in the core melt, the rate of chain-reactions will increase and lead to an extreme and uncontrolled heating-up process. When the reactor vessel does not resist or when a huge amount of radiation emerges, the accident is called 'maximum assumed accident'.



Nuclear Reactor / PWR – Not safe from terrorist attacks and plane crashes

The Oekoinstitut [ecological institute] Darmstadt
has calculated the areal impact of a disaster of the kind described above, using the PWR of the French nuclear power plant Fessenheim as an example. The study was based on an assumed major accident in the French EDF/EnBW- nuclear power plant Fessenheim:

In case of south-west wind and rain, the area of damage would have a spread of up to 370 km from Fessenheim to the region of Würzburg-Nürnberg. If the Chernobyl guidelines were adopted, in this zone all inhabitants would have to be evacuated for a period of 50 years.



Klaus Traube
(nuclear expert; former director of AEG´s nuclear reactor department at General Dynamics, San Diego; after this, head of Interatom) wrote:

The analysis of numerous hazardous incidents shows that they usually are triggered off by an unexpected concurrence of malfunctions and operating errors (like for example in the Harrisburg/Three Mile Island accident and, by the way, in Chernobyl as well). Individually, the malfunctions and errors seem to be trivial. Elaborate risk studies dealing with the possibilities and probabilities of a nuclear reactor´s disastrous breakdown arrive at the same conclusion. They confirm: Every running reactor at any time renders possible accidents leading to nuclear meltdowns with a subsequent disastrous release of radioactivity. Not the truth of this statement, but solely the probability of occurrence is debated among experts. Furthermore, it is a fact that acts of terrorism (like for example plane crashes) can cause a nuclear disaster. Again, solely the probability is debatable.


Axel Mayer, BUND Freiburg



Recent discussions about thorium reactors (terrorism / danger - thorium-based nuclear power)


Nuclear power companies
plan to build small „environmentally friendly and green” thorium reactors distributed among the whole world. The research is also financed by EU-money.
The old pressurised water reactors and boiling water reactors should be replaced by many small thorium reactors. You call them also liquid fluoride thorium reactors.

But these companies don´t consider that only one of these mini-reactors emit a amount of radioactivity that is as high as the one of many Hiroshima bombs. An accident or a terroristic attack on one of these mini-reactors could destroy a whole city. Many of these small reactors are, inevitably, insecure targets. If there stood some of these reactors in countries like Syria or Iraq, terroristic organisations like the “IS (or ISIS)” could gain in power by building so-called “dirty bombs”.

The idea of distributing thorium reactors among the whole world is a nuclear nightmare and can be described as a global suicide programm. It´s another example of the destructive era of the “Anthropocene”.

Here you will find more information about thorium-based nuclear energy.






Climate Change and Nuclear Power


Saving the Climate with Nuclear Energy?
The nuclear power industry and its governmental allies are spending tens of millions of dollars annually to promote atomic power as an “emissions-free” energy source. Their goal is to encourage the construction of new nuclear reactors in the U.S. in France, England and worldwide and prevent the shutdown of dangerous old reactors (Fessenheim, Beznau, Mühleberg....) that cannot compete economically with clean energy sources like wind and solar power..

Yet nuclear power is not only ineffective at addressing climate change, when the entire fuel chain is examined, nuclear power is a net producer of greenhouse gases. Adding enough nuclear power to make a meaningful reduction in greenhouse gas emissions would cost trillions of dollars, create tens of thousands of tons of lethal high-level radioactive waste, contribute to further proliferation of nuclear weapons materials, result in a Chernobyl or Fukushima-scale accident once every decade or so, and, perhaps most significantly, squander the resources necessary to implement meaningful climate change policies.
Source of this section and where to go for up-to-date information on nuclear power and climate.




Réseau "Sortir du nucléaire"/
French Nuclear Phaseout Network
06/03/10 - Press release

Revelations from an EDF insider : EPR reactor prone to major nuclear accident risk!



The French Network for Nuclear Phase-out (Réseau "Sortir du nucléaire") reveals confidential documents disclosed by an anonymous insider from EDF (Electricité de France, the main French power utility). These documents show that the design of the EPR presents a serious risk of a major nuclear accident - a risk deliberately taken by EDF to increase its profitability. Because it is potentially vulnerable to a situation which could have uncontrollable consequences, the EPR reactor is extremely dangerous.

Download the confidential documents (in French) from www.sortirdunucleaire.org

"Sortir du nucléaire" has set up a group of experts to analyse these recently received documents thoroughly. Here are the first lessons we can learn from them, which are of the utmost importance.

Some operating modes could cause the EPR reactor
to explode because of a control rod cluster ejection accident (these control rod clusters moderate the nuclear reaction). These operating modes are mainly related to an objective of economic efficiency, requiring the power of the reactor to adapt to electricity demand. Thus, in order to find a hypothetical economic justification for the EPR, its designers chose to take the very real risk of a major nuclear accident. Moreover, most of the arguments given in favour of the EPR (power, efficiency, waste reduction and safety) have been proved to be false.

EDF and Areva
(the leader of the French nuclear industry) have tried to find a solution to the problems related to the operating mode of the reactor: these efforts have failed preventing those kinds of accidents. The French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) has apparently been kept in the dark about these issues.

So the EPR reactor design seems to increase the risk of a Chernobyl-type accident, which would lead to the destruction of the confinement and mass dispersion of radionuclides in the atmosphere.

On March 8th and 9th, Paris hosts an international meeting to encourage 65 countries to acquire nuclear technology. This meeting will be opened by the French President Nicolas Sarkozy and chaired by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Yukiya Amano. It is outrageous that France keeps on promoting nuclear power in general and the EPR reactor in particular, as the danger of this reactor has now been demonstrated. The construction of the EPR in Finland, France and China must be stopped immediately, and the planned project in Penly (France) cancelled. The best way to prevent nuclear accidents is indeed to phase out nuclear power and go for renewable energies.


The accident scenario in detail:
According to calculations by EDF and Areva, the reactor’s RIP (Instant Return to Power) control mode and the control rod cluster configuration can induce a rod ejection accident during low-power operation, and lead to the rupture of the control rod drive casing (i). This rupture would cause the coolant to leak outside the nuclear reactor vessel. Such a loss of coolant accident (LOCA - a very serious type of nuclear accident) would damage a large number of fuel rods by heating fuel pellets and claddings (ii), and thus cause the release of highly radioactive steam into the containment. So there is a great risk of a criticality accident resulting in an explosion (iii), the reactor power being increased in an extremely brutal way. Following the ejection of control rod clusters during low-power operation, the reactor emergency shutdown may fail (iv). Whatever the configuration of the control rod clusters, a rod ejection accident induces a high rate of broken fuel rods and therefore a high risk of a criticality accident (v).

For more details, see the documents disclosed by an anonymous EDF source (especially document No. 1) on our website: www.sortirdunucleaire.org


Documents to download:
1 - Summary - “Une technologie explosive : l'EPR” (anonymous and undated)
2 - “Bilan de la phase préliminaire de l'étude d'EDG FA3 et perspectives”(EDF SEPTEN May 2009)
3 - “EPR – Gestion combustible – Lot 1 – Revue de conception du schéma de grappes FA3 du 25/10/2007”
4 –“EPR FA3 – Synthèse de l'étude de faisabilité de l'accident d'éjection de grappe” (EDF SEPTEN September 2007)
5 - “EPR FA3- Synthèse des voies de sortie de la problématique éjection de grappe” (EDF SEPTEN July 2007)
6 – Working paper: “Présentation synthétique de l'EPR” (EDF SEPTEN April 2004)
7 - “Note de présentation de la deuxième revue de projet radioprotection EPR” (EDF, Spring 2004)
8 - “Marges disponibles pour les activités d'exploitation du REP par rapport aux risques de criticité” (EDF SEPTEN April 2009)

Notes :
i See. paragraph 6.1.6 Document No. 4
ii Cf. Table 3, Document No. 4
iii See Document n°4, Document n°5 Part 2, « Rapport Préliminaire de Sûreté EPR 15.2.4.e »
iv See Document n°2, note 9
v See Document n°2, note 8.2.1












Danger: Nuclear Reactors worldwide (18.10.07)


(World Nuclear Association)
Almaraz-1, Spain, PWR
Almaraz-2, Spain, PWR
Angra-1, Brazil, PWR
Angra-2, Brazil, PWR
Arkansas Nuclear One-1, United States, PWR
Arkansas Nuclear One-2, United States, PWR
Armenia-2 (Metsamor), Armenia, PWR/VVER
Asco-1, Spain, PWR
Asco-2, Spain, PWR
Atucha-1, Argentina, PHWR
Balakovo-1, Russian Federation, PWR/VVER
Balakovo-2, Russian Federation, PWR/VVER
Balakovo-3, Russian Federation, PWR/VVER
Balakovo-4, Russian Federation, PWR/VVER
Beaver Valley-1, United States, PWR
Beaver Valley-2, United States, PWR
Belleville-1, France, PWR
Belleville-2, France, PWR
Beloyarsk-3 (BN-600), Russian Federation, FBR
Beznau-1, Switzerland, PWR
Beznau-2, Switzerland, PWR
Biblis-A, Germany, PWR
Biblis-B, Germany, PWR
Bilibino unit A, Russian Federation, LWGR/EGP
Bilibino unit B, Russian Federation, LWGR/EGP
Bilibino unit C, Russian Federation, LWGR/EGP
Bilibino unit D, Russian Federation, LWGR/EGP
Blayais-1, France, PWR
Blayais-2, France, PWR
Blayais-3, France, PWR
Blayais-4, France, PWR
Bohunice-1, Slovak Republic, PWR/VVER
Bohunice-2, Slovak Republic, PWR/VVER
Bohunice-3, Slovak Republic, PWR/VVER
Bohunice-4, Slovak Republic, PWR/VVER
Borssele, Netherlands, PWR
Braidwood-1, United States, PWR
Braidwood-2, United States, PWR
Brokdorf, Germany, PWR
Browns Ferry-2, United States, BWR
Browns Ferry-3, United States, BWR
Bruce-3, Canada, PHWR/CANDU
Bruce-4, Canada, PHWR/CANDU
Bruce-5, Canada, PHWR/CANDU
Bruce-6, Canada, PHWR/CANDU
Bruce-7, Canada, PHWR/CANDU
Bruce-8, Canada, PHWR/CANDU
Brunsbuttel, Germany, BWR
Brunswick-1, United States, BWR
Brunswick-2, United States, BWR
Bugey-2, France, PWR
Bugey-3, France, PWR
Bugey-4, France, PWR
Bugey-5, France, PWR
Byron-1, United States, PWR
Byron-2, United States, PWR
Callaway-1, United States, PWR
Calvert Cliffs-1, United States, PWR
Calvert Cliffs-2, United States, PWR
Catawba-1, United States, PWR
Catawba-2, United States, PWR
Cattenom-1, France, PWR
Cattenom-2, France, PWR
Cattenom-3, France, PWR
Cattenom-4, France, PWR
Cernavoda-1, Romania, PHWR/CANDU
Chasnupp-1, Pakistan, PWR
Chin Shan-1, Taiwan, BWR
Chin Shan-2, Taiwan, BWR
Chinon-B1, France, PWR
Chinon-B2, France, PWR
Chinon-B3, France, PWR
Chinon-B4, France, PWR
Chooz-B1, France, PWR
Chooz-B2, France, PWR
Civaux-1, France, PWR
Civaux-2, France, PWR
Clinton-1, United States, BWR
Cofrentes, Spain, BWR
Columbia (WNP-2), United States, BWR
Comanche Peak-1, United States, PWR
Comanche Peak-2, United States, PWR
Cooper, United States, BWR
Cruas-1, France, PWR
Cruas-2, France, PWR
Cruas-3, France, PWR
Cruas-4, France, PWR
Crystal River-3, United States, PWR
Dampierre-1, France, PWR
Dampierre-2, France, PWR
Dampierre-3, France, PWR
Dampierre-4, France, PWR
Darlington-1, Canada, PHWR/CANDU
Darlington-2, Canada, PHWR/CANDU
Darlington-3, Canada, PHWR/CANDU
Darlington-4, Canada, PHWR/CANDU
Davis Besse-1, United States, PWR
Diablo Canyon-1, United States, PWR
Diablo Canyon-2, United States, PWR
Doel-1, Belgium, PWR
Doel-2, Belgium, PWR
Doel-3, Belgium, PWR
Doel-4, Belgium, PWR
Donald Cook-1, United States, PWR
Donald Cook-2, United States, PWR
Dresden-2, United States, BWR
Dresden-3, United States, BWR
Duane Arnold-1, United States, BWR
Dukovany-1, Czech Republic, PWR/VVER
Dukovany-2, Czech Republic, PWR/VVER
Dukovany-3, Czech Republic, PWR/VVER
Dukovany-4, Czech Republic, PWR/VVER
Dungeness-A1, United Kingdom, GCR (Magnox)
Dungeness-A2, United Kingdom, GCR (Magnox)
Dungeness-B1, United Kingdom, AGR
Dungeness-B2, United Kingdom, AGR
Embalse, Argentina, PHWR
Emsland, Germany, PWR
Enrico Fermi-2, United States, BWR
Farley-1, United States, PWR
Farley-2, United States, PWR
Fessenheim-1, France, PWR
Fessenheim-2, France, PWR
Fitzpatrick, United States, BWR
Flamanville-1, France, PWR
Flamanville-2, France, PWR
Forsmark-1, Sweden, BWR
Forsmark-2, Sweden, BWR
Forsmark-3, Sweden, BWR
Fort Calhoun-1, United States, PWR
Fukushima-Daiichi-1, Japan, BWR
Fukushima-Daiichi-2, Japan, BWR
Fukushima-Daiichi-3, Japan, BWR
Fukushima-Daiichi-4, Japan, BWR
Fukushima-Daiichi-5, Japan, BWR
Fukushima-Daiichi-6, Japan, BWR
Fukushima-Daini-1, Japan, BWR
Fukushima-Daini-2, Japan, BWR
Fukushima-Daini-3, Japan, BWR
Fukushima-Daini-4, Japan, BWR
Genkai-1, Japan, PWR
Genkai-2, Japan, PWR
Genkai-3, Japan, PWR
Genkai-4, Japan, PWR
Gentilly-2, Canada, PHWR/CANDU
Goesgen, Switzerland, PWR
Golfech-1, France, PWR
Golfech-2, France, PWR
Grafenrheinfeld, Germany, PWR
Grand Gulf-1, United States, BWR
Gravelines-1, France, PWR
Gravelines-2, France, PWR
Gravelines-3, France, PWR
Gravelines-4, France, PWR
Gravelines-5, France, PWR
Gravelines-6, France, PWR
Grohnde, Germany, PWR
Guangdong-1 (Daya Bay 1), China, mainland, PWR
Guangdong-2 (Daya Bay 2), China, mainland, PWR
Gundremmingen-B, Germany, BWR
Gundremmingen-C, Germany, BWR
H B Robinson-2, United States, PWR
Hamaoka-1, Japan, BWR
Hamaoka-2, Japan, BWR
Hamaoka-3, Japan, BWR
Hamaoka-4, Japan, BWR
Hamaoka-5, Japan, ABWR
Hartlepool-1, United Kingdom, AGR
Hartlepool-2, United Kingdom, AGR
Hatch-1, United States, BWR
Hatch-2, United States, BWR
Heysham-A1, United Kingdom, AGR
Heysham-A2, United Kingdom, AGR
Heysham-B1, United Kingdom, AGR
Heysham-B2, United Kingdom, AGR
Hinkley Point-B1, United Kingdom, AGR
Hinkley Point-B2, United Kingdom, AGR
Hope Creek-1, United States, BWR
Hunterston-B1, United Kingdom, AGR
Hunterston-B2, United Kingdom, AGR
Ignalina-2, Lithuania, LWGR/RBMK
Ikata-1, Japan, PWR
Ikata-2, Japan, PWR
Ikata-3, Japan, PWR
Indian Point-2, United States, PWR
Indian Point-3, United States, PWR
Isar-1, Germany, BWR
Isar-2, Germany, PWR
Jose Cabrera-1 (Zorita), Spain, PWR
Kaiga-1, India, PHWR
Kaiga-2, India, PHWR
Kakrapar-1, India, PHWR
Kakrapar-2, India, PHWR
Kalinin-1, Russian Federation, PWR/VVER
Kalinin-2, Russian Federation, PWR/VVER
Kalinin-3, Russian Federation, PWR/VVER
Kanupp, Pakistan, PHWR
Kashiwazaki Kariwa-1, Japan, BWR
Kashiwazaki Kariwa-2, Japan, BWR
Kashiwazaki Kariwa-3, Japan, BWR
Kashiwazaki Kariwa-4, Japan, BWR
Kashiwazaki Kariwa-5, Japan, BWR
Kashiwazaki Kariwa-6, Japan, ABWR
Kashiwazaki Kariwa-7, Japan, ABWR
Khmelnitski-1, Ukraine, PWR/VVER
Khmelnitski-2, Ukraine, PWR/VVER
Koeberg-1, South Africa, PWR
Koeberg-2, South Africa, PWR
Kola-1, Russian Federation, PWR/VVER
Kola-2, Russian Federation, PWR/VVER
Kola-3, Russian Federation, PWR/VVER
Kola-4, Russian Federation, PWR/VVER
Kori-1, Korea RO (South), PWR
Kori-2, Korea RO (South), PWR
Kori-3, Korea RO (South), PWR
Kori-4, Korea RO (South), PWR
Kozloduy-3, Bulgaria, PWR/VVER
Kozloduy-4, Bulgaria, PWR/VVER
Kozloduy-5, Bulgaria, PWR/VVER
Kozloduy-6, Bulgaria, PWR/VVER
Krsko, Slovenia, PWR
Krummel, Germany, BWR
Kuosheng-1, Taiwan, BWR
Kuosheng-2, Taiwan, BWR
Kursk-1, Russian Federation, LWGR/RBMK
Kursk-2, Russian Federation, LWGR/RBMK
Kursk-3, Russian Federation, LWGR/RBMK
Kursk-4, Russian Federation, LWGR/RBMK
Laguna Verde-1, Mexico, BWR
Laguna Verde-2, Mexico, BWR
LaSalle-1, United States, BWR
LaSalle-2, United States, BWR
Leibstadt, Switzerland, BWR
Leningrad-1, Russian Federation, LWGR/RBMK
Leningrad-2, Russian Federation, LWGR/RBMK
Leningrad-3, Russian Federation, LWGR/RBMK
Leningrad-4, Russian Federation, LWGR/RBMK
Limerick-1, United States, BWR
Limerick-2, United States, BWR
Lingao-1, China, mainland, PWR
Lingao-2, China, mainland, PWR
Loviisa-1, Finland, PWR/VVER
Loviisa-2, Finland, PWR/VVER
Maanshan-1, Taiwan, PWR
Maanshan-2, Taiwan, PWR
Madras-1, India, PHWR
Madras-2, India, PHWR
McGuire-1, United States, PWR
McGuire-2, United States, PWR
Mihama-1, Japan, PWR
Mihama-2, Japan, PWR
Mihama-3, Japan, PWR
Millstone-2, United States, PWR
Millstone-3, United States, PWR
Mochovce-1, Slovak Republic, PWR/VVER
Mochovce-2, Slovak Republic, PWR/VVER
Monticello, United States, BWR
Muehleberg, Switzerland, BWR
Narora-1, India, PHWR
Narora-2, India, PHWR
Neckarwestheim-1, Germany, PWR
Neckarwestheim-2, Germany, PWR
Nine Mile Point-1, United States, BWR
Nine Mile Point-2, United States, BWR
Nogent-1, France, PWR
Nogent-2, France, PWR
North Anna-1, United States, PWR
North Anna-2, United States, PWR
Novovoronezh-3, Russian Federation, PWR/VVER
Novovoronezh-4, Russian Federation, PWR/VVER
Novovoronezh-5, Russian Federation, PWR/VVER
Oconee-1, United States, PWR
Oconee-2, United States, PWR
Oconee-3, United States, PWR
Ohi-1, Japan, PWR
Ohi-2, Japan, PWR
Ohi-3, Japan, PWR
Ohi-4, Japan, PWR
Oldbury-1, United Kingdom, GCR (Magnox)
Oldbury-2, United Kingdom, GCR (Magnox)
Olkiluoto-1, Finland, BWR
Olkiluoto-2, Finland, BWR
Onagawa-1, Japan, BWR
Onagawa-2, Japan, BWR
Onagawa-3, Japan, BWR
Oskarshamn-1, Sweden, BWR
Oskarshamn-2, Sweden, BWR
Oskarshamn-3, Sweden, BWR
Oyster Creek, United States, BWR
Paks-1, Hungary, PWR
Paks-2, Hungary, PWR
Paks-3, Hungary, PWR
Paks-4, Hungary, PWR
Palisades, United States, PWR
Palo Verde-1, United States, PWR
Palo Verde-2, United States, PWR
Palo Verde-3, United States, PWR
Paluel-1, France, PWR
Paluel-2, France, PWR
Paluel-3, France, PWR
Paluel-4, France, PWR
Peach Bottom-2, United States, BWR
Peach Bottom-3, United States, BWR
Penly-1, France, PWR
Penly-2, France, PWR
Perry-1, United States, BWR
Phenix, France, FBR
Philippsburg-1, Germany, BWR
Philippsburg-2, Germany, PWR
Pickering-1, Canada, PHWR/CANDU
Pickering-4, Canada, PHWR/CANDU
Pickering-5, Canada, PHWR/CANDU
Pickering-6, Canada, PHWR/CANDU
Pickering-7, Canada, PHWR/CANDU
Pickering-8, Canada, PHWR/CANDU
Pilgrim-1, United States, BWR
Point Beach-1, United States, PWR
Point Beach-2, United States, PWR
Point Lepreau, Canada, PHWR/CANDU
Prairie Island-1, United States, PWR
Prairie Island-2, United States, PWR
Qinshan-1, China, mainland, PWR
Qinshan-2, China, mainland, PWR
Qinshan-3, China, mainland, PWR
Qinshan-4, China, mainland, PHWR/CANDU
Qinshan-5, China, mainland, PHWR/CANDU
Quad Cities-1, United States, BWR
Quad Cities-2, United States, BWR
R E Ginna, United States, PWR
Rajasthan-1, India, PHWR
Rajasthan-2, India, PHWR
Rajasthan-3, India, PHWR
Rajasthan-4, India, PHWR
Ringhals-1, Sweden, BWR
Ringhals-2, Sweden, PWR
Ringhals-3, Sweden, PWR
Ringhals-4, Sweden, PWR
River Bend-1, United States, BWR
Rovno-1, Ukraine, PWR/VVER
Rovno-2, Ukraine, PWR/VVER
Rovno-3, Ukraine, PWR/VVER
Rovno-4, Ukraine, PWR/VVER
Salem-1, United States, PWR
Salem-2, United States, PWR
San Onofre-2, United States, PWR
San Onofre-3, United States, PWR
Santa Maria de Garona, Spain, BWR
Seabrook-1, United States, PWR
Sendai-1, Japan, PWR
Sendai-2, Japan, PWR
Sequoyah-1, United States, PWR
Sequoyah-2, United States, PWR
Shearon Harris-1, United States, PWR
Shika-1, Japan, BWR
Shimane-1, Japan, BWR
Shimane-2, Japan, BWR
Sizewell-A1, United Kingdom, GCR (Magnox)
Sizewell-A2, United Kingdom, GCR (Magnox)
Sizewell-B, United Kingdom, PWR
Smolensk-1, Russian Federation, LWGR/RBMK
Smolensk-2, Russian Federation, LWGR/RBMK
Smolensk-3, Russian Federation, LWGR/RBMK
South Texas-1, United States, PWR
South Texas-2, United States, PWR
South Ukraine-1, Ukraine, PWR/VVER
South Ukraine-2, Ukraine, PWR/VVER
South Ukraine-3, Ukraine, PWR/VVER
St. Alban-1, France, PWR
St. Alban-2, France, PWR
St. Laurent-B1, France, PWR
St. Laurent-B2, France, PWR
St. Lucie-1, United States, PWR
St. Lucie-2, United States, PWR
Surry-1, United States, PWR
Surry-2, United States, PWR
Susquehanna-1, United States, BWR
Susquehanna-2, United States, BWR
Takahama-1, Japan, PWR
Takahama-2, Japan, PWR
Takahama-3, Japan, PWR
Takahama-4, Japan, PWR
Tarapur-1, India, BWR
Tarapur-2, India, BWR
Tarapur-4, India, PHWR
Temelin-1, Czech Republic, PWR/VVER
Temelin-2, Czech Republic, PWR/VVER
Three Mile Island-1, United States, PWR
Tianwan-1, China, mainland, PWR/VVER
Tihange-1, Belgium, PWR
Tihange-2, Belgium, PWR
Tihange-3, Belgium, PWR
Tokai-2, Japan, BWR
Tomari-1, Japan, PWR
Tomari-2, Japan, PWR
Torness unit A, United Kingdom, AGR
Torness unit B, United Kingdom, AGR
Tricastin-1, France, PWR
Tricastin-2, France, PWR
Tricastin-3, France, PWR
Tricastin-4, France, PWR
Trillo-1, Spain, PWR
Tsuruga-1, Japan, BWR
Tsuruga-2, Japan, PWR
Turkey Point-3, United States, PWR
Turkey Point-4, United States, PWR
Ulchin-1, Korea RO (South), PWR
Ulchin-2, Korea RO (South), PWR
Ulchin-3, Korea RO (South), PWR
Ulchin-4, Korea RO (South), PWR
Ulchin-5, Korea RO (South), PWR
Unterweser, Germany, PWR
Vandellos-2, Spain, PWR
Vermont Yankee, United States, BWR
Virgil C Summer-1, United States, PWR
Vogtle-1, United States, PWR
Vogtle-2, United States, PWR
Volgodonsk-1 (Rostov), Russian Federation, PWR/VVER
Waterford-3, United States, PWR
Watts Bar-1, United States, PWR
Wolf Creek, United States, PWR
Wolsong-1, Korea RO (South), PHWR
Wolsong-2, Korea RO (South), PHWR
Wolsong-3, Korea RO (South), PHWR
Wolsong-4, Korea RO (South), PHWR
Wylfa-1, United Kingdom, GCR (Magnox)
Wylfa-2, United Kingdom, GCR (Magnox)
Yonggwang-1, Korea RO (South), PWR
Yonggwang-2, Korea RO (South), PWR
Yonggwang-3, Korea RO (South), PWR
Yonggwang-4, Korea RO (South), PWR
Yonggwang-5, Korea RO (South), PWR
Yonggwang-6, Korea RO (South), PWR
Zaporozhe-1, Ukraine, PWR/VVER
Zaporozhe-2, Ukraine, PWR/VVER
Zaporozhe-3, Ukraine, PWR/VVER
Zaporozhe-4, Ukraine, PWR/VVER
Zaporozhe-5, Ukraine, PWR/VVER
Zaporozhe-6, Ukraine, PWR/VVER

Legende:

PWR = Pressurized Water Reactors
BWR = Boiling Water Reactors
CANDU = Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor
AGR = Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor
VVER = Vodo-Vodyanoi Energetichesky Reactor
PHWR = Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor
LWGR = grahite moderated light water cooled
RBMK = Reaktor Bolshoy Moshchnosti Kanalniy
ABWR = Advanced Boiling Water Reactor
EGP = graphite channel power reactor with steam overheat
FBR = Fast Breeder Reactor
GCR (Magnox) = Gas Cooled Reactor
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Dieser Artikel wurde 22391 mal gelesen und am 10.10.2016 zuletzt geändert.